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Abstract There are a plethora of highly plausible cases, such as DeRose’s bank
cases, in which our intuition very strongly suggests that it can be more difοcult to
know something when there is a great deal at stake. Intuitively, though, whether
or not an agent knows a proposition should not depend on what is at stake for that
agent, but rather on such things as the subject’s evidence, their justiοcation and
the truth or falsity of the object of purported knowledge. This paper attempts to
provide a survey of the existing literature on this topic and to provide an assessment
of theprospects for a coherent account of the stake-sensitivity of knowledge, assum-
ing that such sensitivity obtains. The author begins with an exposition of DeRose’s
bank cases, which is followed by arguments for and against the stake-sensitivity of
knowledge. After a brief exploration of the experimental literature regarding folk
intuitions in cases that purport to demonstrate stake-sensitivity, this paper will con-
sider two accounts of the stake-sensitivity of knowledge—namely epistemic Contex-
tualism and Subject-Sensitive Invariantism (SSI)—examining the beneοts and draw-
backs of each in turn. The author will argue that SSI is best-placed to account for the
stake-sensitivity of knowledge, mostly because of a strong and largely unresolved
linguistic objection levied against the very heart of Contextualism.
1 Introduction
Some claim that it can be more diĜcult for a subject to know something when there
is a great deal at stake. I will call this view “stake-sensitivity”. Proponents of stake-
sensitivity often appeal to theories such as Epistemic Contextualism and Subject-
Sensitive Invariantism (henceforth “SSI”), each of which provides quite a diěerent
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account of how the stakes aěect knowledge. Others argue that the stakes do not aěect
knowledge. I will begin with a brief look at both sides of the debate before moving
on to explore which of these two theories, Contextualism or SSI, is best able to ex-
plain the stake-sensitivity of knowledge, assuming that such sensitivity obtains. In
my exploration, I will consider objections to the accounts of stake-sensitivity that the
theories provide, as well as general objections to the theories themselves. After all,
if the theories do not hold well in general then they cannot be used as bases for ac-
counts of stake-sensitivity, no maĴer how appealing those accounts may be. I will
ultimately ęnd that SSI is beĴer placed to account for stake-sensitivity, mostly owing
to the existence of a strong and unresolved objection to Contextualism.
2 The debate
The debate amongst philosophers as to whether or not it is more diĜcult to know
something when there is a great deal at stake is far from resolved. Before I go on, I will
state a well-accepted and intuitively correct view:
(Intellectualism) Whether or not a subject, S, is in a position to know a proposition, p,
is determined exclusively by purely truth-relevant dimensions with
respect to p, such as S’s justięcation for believing that p, S’s evidence
that p, and so on.1
2.1 It is more difοcult to know something when there is a great
deal at stake.
Consider the following two cases.
Bank case A Hannah and her wife, Sarah, are driving home on Friday af-
ternoon. They plan to stop at the bank to deposit their paycheques. Driving
past the bank, they notice the large queue. It is not important for them to
make the deposit immediately, so Hannah suggests that they return in the
morning when it will be quieter, to which Sarah responds, “It might be shut.
Lots of banks are closed on Saturdays.” Hannah replies, “No, I know it’ll be
open. I was there two Saturdays ago. It’s open until midday.”
1. Also known as Purism, as in Fantl andMcGrath (2009, 27–28). Their deęnition is more complex, as
are their purposes.
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Bank case B Hannah and Sarah drive to the bank on Friday afternoon, as
in Case A, when they notice the long queue. Hannah again suggests coming
back in themorning, recountingwhen prompted her experience of twoweeks
previous. However, in this case, their house will be repossessed if they make
their deposit any later than Saturdaymorning. Sarah reminds Hannah of this
and then says, “Banks sometimes change their hours. Do you know they’ll
be open tomorrow?” Still as conędent as she was before that the bank will be
open, Hannah replies, “Well, no. I’ll go in and check.”2
These are Keith DeRose’s bank cases. Note that, in both cases, the bank is open on
Saturday morning.
Stake-sensitivists are often motivated by twin cases like these. They claim that it is
obvious that both of the following are true:
(1) In case A, when Hannah says, “I know it’ll be open,” she is speaking truly.
(2) In case B, when Hannah says that she does not know, she is speaking truly.
There is an apparent contradiction between (1) and (2), which the stake-sensitivist
must address. If intellectualism is true, then (1) and (2) cannot both be true, because
case A and case B do not diěer with respect to truth-directed dimensions. According
to intellectualism, Hannah is in a position to know that the bank is open in case A if
and only if she is in a position to know in case B.
The view that I have thus far been referring to as stake-sensitivity is really com-
prised of a variety of diěerent views. One prominent stake-sensitivist view is based
on Contextualism, and another on SSI. I’ll explain each in turn.
(Epistemic contextualism) The doctrine that the proposition expressed by a know-
ledge aĴribution relative to a context is determined in
part by the standards of justięcation salient in that con-
text (Stanley 2005, 119).
Note that this is essentially a linguistic view about the semantic content of the word
‘know’. The contextualist holds that the proposition expressed by a knowledge aĴribu-
tion (a statement such as, “Meabh knows that x”) varies with the context of aĴribution,
precisely because the meaning of the word ‘know’ varies with the context of uĴerance.
Consequently, she is commiĴed to a spectral view of knowledge, ranging from know-
ledge relations with less justięcation lower down the spectrum (we might call one of
these knowslow), to knowledge relations with more justięcation higher up (knowshigh).
2. Adapted from DeRose (1992, 913). The re-assignation of the subjects’ names (and sexuality) is
taken from Stanley (2005, 3–4).
4 Aporia VЂϿ. 19 NЂ. 2
In DeRose’s bank cases, the stake-sensitivist contextualist says that (1) is true, be-
cause the absence of high stakes means that the standards of justięcation salient in
the context of Hannah’s self-aĴribution of knowledge are low. Thus, what Hannah is
really, truly saying is that she knowslow that the bank will be open. Similarly, she can
hold that (2) is true because the presence of high stakes in case B results in the stand-
ards of justięcation salient in the context of Hannah’s self-aĴribution being quite high.
Thus, what Hannah truly says is that she does not knowshigh. In this way, the con-
textualist is able to hold without contradiction that (1) and (2) are both true.3 For the
contextualist then, it is more diĜcult to ‘know’ something when the stakes are high,
because the meaning of ‘know’ is more demanding in such contexts.4
SSI yields a similar result by quite diěerent means. The best way of (perhaps
roughly) deęning SSI that I have come across makes use of mostly negative claims
that sharply distinguish it from Contextualism:
(SSI-a) Invariantism. The truth conditions of a knowledge aĴribution do not vary as the
context of aĴribution varies. In other words, it is impossible for an aĴribution
of knowledge of a ęxed proposition to a ęxed subject at a ęxed time to be true
when uĴered by one aĴributor in one context and yet false when uĴered by
another aĴributor in another context (as per Brown 2013, 233–34).
(SSI-b) Impurism. The varying standards that comprise the truth-conditions of a know-
ledge aĴribution include some truth-irrelevant dimensions with respect to p,
alongside traditionally epistemic factors.5
(SSI-c) Subject-sensitivity. The varying standards that comprise the truth-conditions
of a knowledge aĴribution are sensitive to the context occupied by the putat-
ive subject of knowledge, rather than the aĴributor’s context (phrasing as per
DeRose 2005, 283).
This paper is concerned with those forms of SSI that hold that what is at stake for S
over p is one of the truth-irrelevant factors that comprise the truth-conditions of aĴri-
butions of knowledge-that-p to S. A stake-sensitive SSI-ist of this sort might argue that
it is more diĜcult to know something when there is a great deal at stake in the way set
out below.
For the SSI-ist, (1) is true, simply because the standards that comprise the truth-
conditions of Hannah’s self-aĴribution of knowledge are satisęed, given Hannah’s
context. Crucially, as per the impurism prescribed by a stake-sensitivist (SSI-b), these
3. Note that one is not commiĴed to rejecting Contextualism if one rejects intellectualism. For con-
textualist impurism, see Lewis (1996).
4. Some contextualists deny that knowledge is sensitive to the stakes, e.g. Schaěer (2006), but this
paper will discuss stake-sensitive Contextualism only.
5. This is a denial of intellectualism.
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standards include what is at stake for Hannah over the bank’s being open on Saturday.
In a way, the fact that there is very liĴle at stake in this case is one reason that the truth-
conditions of the self-aĴribution have been satisęed – had the stakes been higher, the
standards that comprise these conditionswould have been higher, and thusmore diĜ-
cult to satisfy. There remain two somewhat technical (though crucial) points of clarięc-
ation. Firstly, in accordance with (SSI-c) the stakes for Hannah are a relevant concern
here because they are a component of the context occupied by Hannah as the subject of
the knowledge aĴribution, not because of their being a component of the context occu-
pied by Hannah as the knowledge aĴributor.6 Secondly, if Hannah’s self-aĴribution
is true, then all aĴributions of knowledge-that-the-bank-will-be-open to Hannah are
true on this view, no maĴer who the aĴributor and no maĴer the context of the at-
tribution. This comes from the invariantism in (SSI-a), and is closely related to the
subject-sensitivity of (SSI-c).
For the SSI-ist, (2) is also true. The SSI-ist denies that the meaning of the word
‘know’ has changed, arguing instead that the standards that comprise the truth-
conditions of Hannah’s self-aĴribution of (non-spectral) knowledge are now higher
than they were in case A. This is precisely because, as per (SSI-b), these standards
include what is at stake for Hannah over the bank’s being open on Saturday and so,
despite the traditionally epistemic, truth-directed factors remaining unchanged, the
truth-conditions of Hannah’s self-aĴribution are now more stringent. Since Hannah
has no more evidence or justięcation than she did in the ęrst case, the SSI-ist argues
that these conditions are simply not met and that Hannah does not know. As in case A,
the relevant concern is what is at stake for Hannah as the subject, not as the aĴributor
(from (SSI-c)), and any aĴribution of knowledge to Hannah in case B is false if and
only if Hannah’s self-aĴribution is false (from (SSI-a)). Thus, the SSI-ist claims that
it can be more diĜcult to know something when there is a great deal at stake, but in
a very diěerent way to the contextualist. Unlike the contextualist, the SSI-ist denies
intellectualism by claiming that whether or not a subject, S, stands in the (only, non-
spectral) knowledge relation to a proposition, p, is directly determined by such things
as traditionally epistemic factors, such as the truth of p, S’s evidence and justięcation
for believing p, and so on, plus what is at stake for S over p.
2.2 It is not more difοcult to know something when there is a
great deal at stake.
This section will focus on general objections to stake-sensitivity. It will include an ex-
position of a common misconception about DeRose’s bank cases and an assessment of
6. In this case, it just so happens that the aĴributor and the subject are one and the same, but keeping
a clear distinction is key. Were the two distinct, SSI would track the context occupied by the subject, not
the aĴributor, as per (SSI-c).
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a general objection to stake-sensitivity raised by a number of experimental philosoph-
ers.
On a ęrst reading of DeRose’s bank cases, onemight be tempted to propose that the
high stakes in case B only aěect Hannah’s knowledge via the eěect they have on her
belief. Thus, one might argue, it is not really more diĜcult to know p when there is a
great deal at stake over p, it is just more diĜcult to maintain one’s own belief that p. Of
course, if one loses their belief that p, one may consequently lose their knowledge, but
there are plausible cases of knowledge without belief and we frequently have belief
without knowledge.7 Thus, if high stakes only act on knowledge via belief, then surely
the most we can say is that it is sometimesmore diĜcult to know something when there
is a great deal at stake.
This account of the eěects of the stakes in the bank cases is, however, a mistaken
one. Bank case B specięes that Hannah remains as conędent as she was before that the
bank will be open on Saturday; the stakes have not caused her to lose her belief and
yet, assuming (2) is true, she has lost her knowledge. Nonetheless, one might object
that this is just too odd: if Hannah really still believes that the bank will be open, then
going in to check is irrational. Suppose, as a remedy to this oddity, that Hannah in-
stead refuses to go in and check. In this modięed case, the stakes have certainly not
robbed Hannah of her belief and she acts in accordance with that fact in a natural way.
However, Hannah’s actions seem irresponsible in the extreme. This is surely because
Hannah does not know that the bank is open. The stakes seem to have robbed Hannah
of her knowledge without aěecting her belief. At any rate, the stakes have certainly
not acted on her knowledge via belief as suggested.
Inmy previous discussion of the bank cases and of the commonmisconception con-
cerning them, I implicitly assumed the view that Brown calls ‘folk sensitivity’, namely
that, “folk aĴributions of knowledge are sensitive to the stakes and/or salience of er-
ror” (Brown 2013, 234). This view was the basis of my claim that it is ‘obvious’ or
‘intuitive’ that Hannah knows in case A and that she does not know in case B. This
assumed weight of intuition did a lot of work in motivating the view that it can be
more diĜcult to know something when there is a great deal at stake. Of course, if folk
sensitivity is false, this would impugn stake-sensitivity. A number of experimental
philosophers have conducted studies to test folk sensitivity. Below, I will consider the
ęndings of some of these studies, but I will ultimately argue that the results overall are
inconclusive.
In a paper of 2010, May et al. presented DeRose’s bank cases to folk subjects.
They found that, “neither raising the possibility of error nor raising stakes moves most
people from aĴributing knowledge to denying it” (May et al. 2010, 265). Another study
from Buckwalter (2010) drew similar conclusions. However, studies conducted by
7. For knowledge without belief see the case of the timid student, Lewis (1996, 555). Note that this
is somewhat controversial.
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Pinillos (2011) and by Sripada and Stanley (2012) drew the opposite conclusion that
their data supported folk sensitivity. Some have tried to argue either for or against folk
sensitivity by claiming that the balance of empirical data supports their given view. A
comprehensive review of the empirical data is far outside of the scope of this paper
but what is clear from the disparities between empirical studies’ conclusions is that
we can infer nothing of certainty about folk sensitivity. At most, this paper will accept
the empirical data as showing that folk sensitivity might be false, and thus that some
stake-sensitive viewsmight be undermined (alla Brown), but this is not much of a claim
(Brown 2013).
Notwithstanding the above, it would be remiss not to consider the studies that pur-
port to have found that folk sensitivity is false in a liĴle more detail. May et al. con-
clude that their data points towards the falsity of folk sensitivity, but they do concede
that “the raising of the stakes (but not alternatives) does aěect the level of conędence
people have in their aĴributions of knowledge” (May et al. 2010, 265). This variation
in conędence is to my mind indicative of some underlying folk belief that the stakes
are in some sense relevant to knowledge. One might argue that, on the contrary, the
folk only become less conędent because they think (for Gricean reasons) that the new
information that they have been provided with should in some way be relevant to their
aĴributions of knowledge toHannah. If this were the case, wewould presumably have
seen the same phenomenon in the study whenever the folk were presented with new
information in the second case, but when relevant alternatives were introduced, folk
conędence was undiminished. It thus seems that it is the variation in the stakes that
is causing this variation in folk conędence, which rather impugns the claim that this
particular set of data points to the complete falsity of folk sensitivity.
In summary, althoughMay et al. conclude that folk sensitivity is false, I believe that
elements of their data relating to folk conędence impugn their own conclusions. The
folk may not always possess the same prima facie intuitions as stake-sensitivists but
it seems clear that some basis for epistemic sensitivity to the stakes does exist in folk
intuitions in May et al.’s subjects. There are a multitude of other studies purporting to
disprove folk sensitivity that I have not discussed, but I hope that my examination of
May et al.’s data has served to highlight that there is a signięcant level of uncertainty
surrounding folk sensitivity and that even studies that argue against folk sensitivity
do not always manage to do so deęnitively.
3 Contextualism or SSI?
Contextualism and SSI both oěer aĴractive accounts of how it can be more diĜcult
to know something when there is a great deal at stake. In this section, I will consider
some merits of and objections to these theories, with some possible defences.
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3.1 Contextualism
There is much to be said for Contextualism. Perhaps most importantly, it provides
us with a solution to the apparent contradiction between (1) and (2), but it also accom-
modates our common-sense notion that ‘know’means something diěerent in amurder
trial than it does in a game of trivial pursuit. It is also ostensibly capable of dealingwith
the sceptic in a way that accommodates both our fundamentally unshakable belief that
we have hands, for instance, and our philosophically unshakable belief that we cannot
know for sure.8 It manages to do all of this without rejecting intellectualism. However,
its linguistic nature makes it susceptible both to the charge that it fails to properly en-
gage with the sceptic, and to a strong linguistic objection that will be the focus of this
section.9
The contextualist claims that the word ‘know’ exhibits the property of context-
sensitivity and gradability (i.e. meaning that occupies a point on a spectrum, as de-
termined by context). Gradable adjectives, such as ‘big’ and ‘cold’, are the only cat-
egory of words that exhibit these same properties.10 Consider the word ‘cold’. In,
“It’s cold outside,” ‘cold’ might mean 2°C, whereas in, “Liquid nitrogen is cold,” cold
means−200°C. In a meteorological context, ‘cold’ means something much weaker and
less demanding than in a chemical context, just as ‘knows’ means something much
weaker and less demanding in bank case A than in bank case B.
So Contextualism boils down to the claim that ‘knows’ exhibits the same properties
as gradable adjectives. However, ‘knows’ lacks the degree modięers and comparative
forms that all gradable adjectives possess. Consider the word ‘big’. We can have ‘big-
ger than’, as in, “London is bigger than Edinburgh.” By contrast, we cannot have, “Gog
knows the sky is blue more than Magog knows the sky is blue,” or similar. Likewise,
we can have, “London is very big,” but we cannot have, “Magog very knows that grass
is green,” or similar.
We might follow Stanley in considering ‘really’ as a potential degree modięer for
‘knows’, as in, “Magog really knows that grass is green” (Stanley 2005, 124–25). How-
ever, ‘really’ seems to be functioning to tell us that Magog truly knows. It is not ful-
ęlling the function of a degree modięer, which in the case of ‘knows’ would be to
increase the level of justięcation required in order to satisfy the predicate.(124). As
one further candidate, I will consider ‘for sure’, as in, “Hannah knows for sure that
the bank will be open.” It seems at ęrst glance that ‘for sure’ functions as a degree
modięer, picking out a more demanding knowledge relation. In the negation of the
aĴribution, “Hannah does not know for sure that the bankwill be open,” the promising
8. For the contextualist, the presentation of sceptical hypotheses raises the standards of justięcation
so that ‘know’ refers to a stronger knowledge relation. Thus, the sceptic is only right when we entertain
her. See Lewis (1996, 550) (1996).
9. I set sceptical maĴers aside. See Klein (2000)
10. Some claim that certain verbs (other than ‘know’) also exhibit these properties, but they are few
in number and this is debated.
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behaviour continues; this appears to say that Hannah does not satisfy some stronger
knowledge predicate, although she may satisfy a weaker one. However, we face the
same problem here as we faced with ‘really’. In every other instance (e.g. “Grant is
tall for sure”), ‘for sure’ means ‘deęnitely’, and it functions in a similar way to ‘really’.
When Hannah says she ‘knows for sure’ it seems that Hannah is making a claim about
the likelihood of her self-aĴribution being true, rather than a claim about the strength
of the knowledge. To reject this, one would have to argue that ‘for sure’ functions dif-
ferently when applied to ‘knows’, but only then, and this adds to rather than solves
the contextualist’s problem. At any rate, the extent of the dis-analogy casts signięcant
doubt on the gradability of knowledge.
Clearly, the contextualist has some explaining to do. There is a way out, but the
road is bumpy, and it is not clear that Contextualism survives the journey. The con-
textualist can claim that ‘knows’ is sui generis, as Brown puts it, but this clearly needs
a great deal of justięcation.11 Why is ‘knows’ sui generis? Well, the contextualist might
respond by pointing out that ‘knows’ is the only context-sensitive and gradable word
about which there is a ęeld of philosophical enquiry. Given that fact, would it be
so surprising if it were a linguistic special case? Perhaps ‘know’ and its cognates
have developed in line with an erroneous, common-sense understanding of the nature
of knowledge as bivalent, as per the intuitively correct common-sense doctrine that,
‘either you know, or you don’t’.12 Perhaps it was this folk conception that prevented
degree modięers and comparative forms from developing in ordinary usage. How-
ever, if we follow this road, we also have to explain why (1) and (2) do count as or-
dinary usage. The contextualist’s central claim is that we ordinarily use ‘knows’ in a
gradable way. Defending this claim against the linguistic objection by claiming that
the word ‘knows’ and its cognates developed in a way that was heavily inĚuenced by
a non-gradable understanding of knowledge is perhaps too close to cuĴing oě one’s
nose to spite one’s face.
Notwithstanding the signięcant linguistic issues, we have plenty of reasons to be-
lieve that we do use ‘knows’ in a context-sensitive way—‘knowing’ is undoubtedly
diěerent in a murder trial than it is in a pub quiz—but this sort of evidence does noth-
ing to save Contextualism as a linguistic theory.
3.2 SSI
SSI also oěers an aĴractive resolution to the bank cases and others like them. SSI does
this by claiming that some of the factors that determine whether or not a subject is in
11. By ‘sui generis’ Brown, roughly, should be taken to mean that the word ‘knows’ is linguistically in
a class of its own, being the only context-sensitive and gradable word that lacks degree modięers and
comparative forms.
12. I claim that the doctrine would be historically intuitively correct to folk subjects who have not
considered bank cases, or similar.
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a position to know that p are pragmatic (and thus not truth-directed), and that these
include what is at stake for S over p. Unlike Contextualism, this means that SSI only
manages to oěer a solution at the cost of rejecting intellectualism, which amounts to
what Kvanvig (2004) originally coined ‘pragmatic encroachment’ on knowledge. This,
for many, is a pill that is very hard to swallow. In this section, I will outline why prag-
matic encroachment is a problem for SSI before going on to consider the problemposed
by certain types of third-person cases for SSI and the projectivist response thereto.
As Fantl and McGrath put it, pragmatic encroachment is mad (Fantl and McGrath
2009, 28). It’s mad because it constitutes the loss of the intuitive, plausible doctrine
of intellectualism. It just seems wrong that non-truth-directed factors are relevant to
whether or not one is in a position to know. Of course, the SSI-ist could bite the bullet
and say that some non-truth-directed factors, such as the stakes, just are relevant to
knowledge. If the objector continues to insist that this is ‘just wrong’, then the SSI-ist
would appear to be within her rights to request an alternative solution to the bank
cases. Reed objects extensively to the pragmatic encroachment entailed by SSI, and he
does indeed suggest an alternative (Reed 2013, 104–05). However, the alternative that
he suggests is Contextualism and, as we have seen, this is not without problems of its
own. Indeed, I do not accept, given what we have seen so far, that Contextualism is
clearly preferable to SSI. Pragmatic encroachment might be a bit mad, but it is not that
mad. Ultimately, SSI functions as an appealing and otherwise natural explanation of
what is happening in the bank cases.
DeRose provides what he believes to be, “a killer objection,” to SSI, which utilises
the following case (DeRose 2005, 185) .
Thelma and Louise Hannah and her wife, Sarah, are driving home on Fri-
day afternoon. They plan to stop at the Thelma is being asked by the police
whether John could have commiĴed the awful crime they are investigating.
Thelma admits that she does not ‘know’ various propositions on this maĴer
unless she is in an extremely strong epistemic positions with respect to them.
Thelma has reliable testimony that John was in the oĜce yesterday, which
would ordinarily be grounds for knowledge, but she holds that the weak-
est grounds for knowledge that John was in the oĜce in her actual context
would consist of, say, having seen John in the oĜce herself. The police then
ask Thelma whether Louise, who is elsewhere, would know whether or not
John was in the oĜce. Thelma knows that Louise is in the same epistemic
position (in the intellectualist sense) as she is, so she replies, “No, she does
not know either” (186–87).
In the case above, the stakes are very high for Thelma. If she says that John could
have commiĴed the crime without being sure enough that this is the case, she risks
wrongfully incriminating John and perhaps even prosecution for the perversion of
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justice if she makes a claim that she is really not justięed in making. However, Louise
is unaware of all this and so, for her, the stakes are not high at all. For the contextualist,
aĴributions of knowledge are governed by the context of the aĴributor, so this poses
no problem. However, on SSI, knowledge is sensitive to the stakes and the broader
context surrounding the putative subject of knowledge. DeRose says that SSI predicts
that Thelmawill apply the lower standards salient in Louise’s context and that she will
thus aĴribute knowledge to Louise, and yet she does not (185). I would argue that al-
though SSI predicts that denials of knowledge to Louise are false, it does not predict
the choices of any speaker. At any rate, says DeRose, the SSI-ist must, “against very
strong appearances,” argue that Thelma’s denial of knowledge to Louise is false (185).
Although I concur that Thelma’s denial is to me intuitively false, my intuition is far
from ‘very strong’.
The ‘projectivist’ defence (alla Hawthorne) against this objection is to claim that
Thelma rightly denies herself knowledge and then mistakenly projects her own ignor-
ance onto Louise (Hawthorne 2003, 162–66). The problemwith this, according to DeR-
ose, is that in cases where Thelma does know (e.g. she saw John herself), Thelma will
still deny knowledge to Louise, even though she has no ignorance to project (DeRose
2005, 187).
What if, rather than projecting her own ignorance, Thelma projects the high stakes
salient in the context of her self-aĴribution onto the context of Louise’s hypothetical
self-aĴribution? That is, what if Thelma actually means “no, Louise would not know,
if she were aware of the stakes?”
Then, even if Thelma had knowledge, she could continue to project the stakes onto
Louise and to thus deny her knowledge. If we pursue this amended defence, one
might raise concerns that we veer too close to aĴributor-sensitivity rather than subject-
sensitivity, or that we are heading towards a contextualist account. It seems to me that
we avoid the former concern for the same reason that the original projectivist defence
does. On my account, the claim is that Thelma mistakenly denies knowledge to Louise
because she projects the high stakes salient in her own context. Interpreted as, “Louise
does not (whilst still unaware of the stakes) know,” we lose subject-sensitivity since
the truth of this depends on features of Thelma’s context only. Interpreted as per my
account, as a modal claim about whether or not Louise would know once aware of the
stakes, we clearly retain subject-sensitivity, since the truth of this depends on features
of Louise’s context only. However, the concern that we are heading towards a contex-
tualist account may be more well-founded. To avoid this, I must assert that if Louise is
unaware of the stakes, then Louise’s self-aĴributions are true, but if she is aware of the
stakes, then they are false. That is, whether or not Louise truly self-aĴributes know-
ledge in this case appears to be sensitive to the context of her self-aĴribution rather
than to what is, whether she knows it or not, at stake for her. Thus, whilst this new
projectivist defence avoids the problem pointed out by DeRose, it perhaps loses some
of SSI in the process.
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Nonetheless, this paper does not accept that this is a ‘killer objection’ to SSI. The
prospects for an alternative defence against this sort of objection seem far from bleak,
and the objection only applies to slightly unusual third-person cases, rather than to the
very heart of the theory.
4 Conclusion
There is some debate as to whether or not it is more diĜcult to know something when
there is a great deal at stake. Contextualism and SSI both oěer aĴractive but diěering
accounts of the eěects of the stakes on knowledge. On the other hand, empirical stud-
ies have impugned folk sensitivity, the very starting point of these theories, although
the collective body of data is contradictory and inconclusive. In my opinion, SSI is
beĴer placed to explain stake-sensitivity than Contextualism, not because SSI oěers a
perfect, objection-free account, but because the linguistic objection to Contextualism is
to my mind a strong, unresolved objection to the very essence of Contextualism that is
stronger than any existing objection to SSI.
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